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ENDING THE ECONOMIC WAR AMONG STATES
NATHAN ALTSTADT*
ABSTRACT
The United States is under siege; however, the cause is not a foreign adversary.
Rather, infighting among states to attract and retain big businesses is jeopardizing the
Nation’s economic prosperity.
States compete for businesses, using tax incentives, hoping to capitalize on the
benefits these businesses represent. Benefits include improved job growth numbers, a
future increase in tax revenue, or, simply, elevated political clout. While competition
can lead to a more efficient use of resources, unregulated competition between states
for businesses does not illustrate this theory. A national auction for a business, where
states are blind to rival offers, may, and arguably does, lead to states offering inflated
tax incentives—tax incentives that discriminate against interstate commerce.
Nonetheless, the Constitution appears to provide a path forward. As seen through
dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the Constitution makes it unlawful for
states to implement tax incentives that discriminate against interstate commerce. But
the current case-by-case approach of litigating the legality of state-level tax incentives
suffers from various inefficiencies. This Note offers an alternative solution.
This Note will argue that ending the economic war among states, caused by the
imprudent distribution of state-level tax incentives, requires Congress to promulgate
legislation modeled after the European Union's State Aid Control Treaty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One problem plagued the United States in its infancy to such an extent that it has
been argued as the main reason for the adoption of the Constitution. 1 This problem
was the “conflict of commercial regulations, destructive to the harmony of the
[s]tates,” created by the inability of the federal government to regulate commercial
intercourse among the states.2 Under the Articles of Confederation,3 each state was
free to adopt “measures fostering its own local interests without regard to possible
prejudice to nonresidents.”4 As one Supreme Court Justice asserted, “[i]f there was
any one object riding over every other in the adoption of the constitution, it was to
keep the commercial intercourse among the [s]tates free from all invidious and partial
restraints.”5
This sentiment of fostering state cooperation was not only the central issue on the
minds of the drafters of the Constitution but remains endorsed as an issue of central
importance by the Supreme Court to this day.6 While the Nation has consistently

1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 281 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
2 Id.
3 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781.
4 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 571 (1997).
5 Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 231.
6 Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 571–72 (citing H.P Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534–35).
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attempted to achieve cooperation between states since its founding, destructive
rivalries between states persist.
Take, for example, Amazon’s widely publicized search for the home of its second
corporate headquarters (HQ2) from 2017–2018.7 After Amazon announced an interest
in finding a home for its HQ2, the company received bids, which included tax
incentives and subsidies, from states across the Nation.8 Over a thirteen-month period,
Amazon solicited these bids while bartering with the prize of bringing a state “50,000
employees and the glory of housing an international tech giant.” 9 How were states
supposed to win this prize? By offering more generous incentives than competing
states and by flaunting the amenities of their state in a more convincing manner than
their counterparts?10 At least one would think that would be the answer. However,
Amazon’s decision did not appear to rest on the merits of the state or city bids. Instead,
Amazon chose to split its headquarters in a predictive manner between Washington,
D.C. and Queens, New York.11 As one commentator put it:
Did the word’s smartest company really need 13 months, and applications
from 238 cities, to reach the striking conclusion that it should invest in New
York and D.C.? The former is America’s heart of capital, and the latter is
America’s literal capital, where Jeff Bezos, chief executive of Amazon,
already owns a house and a newspaper.12
While there is no definite answer, a plausible conclusion is that this “national
auction” was nothing more than an exercise to pit states and cities against each other
in a bidding war to raise the magnitude of the incentives offered by Amazon’s shortlist
of locations on which the company had already decided. If this was the case, Amazon
certainly succeeded by securing multiple billion dollars’ worth of incentive money for
their HQ2.13
Deals such as Amazon’s are not unique. Between 2008 and 2018, incentive
packages totaling more than $1 billion have been rewarded to “Boeing, Nike, Intel,
Royal Dutch Shell, Tesla, Nissan, Ford and General Motors . . . to either move their
headquarters within the U.S. or, quite often to keep their headquarters right where they
7 Derek Thompson, Amazon’s HQ2 Spectacle isn’t Just Shameful—it Should be Illegal, THE
ATLANTIC
(Nov.
12,
2018,
10:10
AM),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/amazons-hq2-spectacle-should-beillegal/575539/.
8 Allison Griswold, A Nearly Complete List of the 238 Places that Bid for Amazon’s Next
Headquarters, QUARTZ (Nov. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/1119945/a-nearly-complete-list-of-the238-places-that-bid-for-amazons-next-headquarters/.
9 Thompson, supra note 7.
10 Nathan M. Jensen, Five Economic Development Takeaways from the Amazon HQ2 Bids,
BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/five-economicdevelopment-takeaways-from-the-amazon-hq2-bids/.
11 Thompson, supra note 7.
12 Id.
13 Jensen, supra note 10.
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are.”14 This competition where states fight over businesses with tax incentives and
subsidies has been described as “the second civil war.” 15 This description is a stark
contrast to the Constitution’s goal of ending “conflict of commercial regulations,
destructive to the harmony of the [s]tates.”16
However, this issue is not just a concern for states and cities pressured into
extending these offers, but also for individual taxpayers whose money is used to
finance these incentive packages;17 incentive packages that have been described by an
economist at George Washington University as having “no discernible impact on firm
expansion, measured by job creation.”18
While some tax incentives appear simply to be a product of economic
protectionism, not all incentives are a product of such disingenuous motivations. As
succinctly put by Greg Leroy from Good Jobs First, “an incentive is [for] something
that should happen but isn’t happening.”19 Thus, this Note is not an argument against
state-level tax incentives in general. Rather, this Note argues for Congress to adopt
legislation that allows for worthy policy objectives, such as revitalizing economically
depressed areas or providing aid to research and development initiatives, to be
achieved through targeted incentives while simultaneously bringing an end to tax
incentives that unlawfully discriminate against interstate commerce. This Note argues
that given the limits of the dormant Commerce Clause in effectuating change through
litigation, ending the economic war among states requires the theory underlying the
dormant Commerce Clause to be promulgated into federal legislation modeled after
the European Union’s (EU) “State Aid Control Treaty.”
In Part II, this Note introduces the type of economic development incentives that
states wield against each other and then establishes how these weapons are used in the
ongoing economic war between these states. Part III of this Note analyzes the dormant
Commerce Clause and the jurisprudence surrounding the doctrine, then highlights the
shortcomings of using this doctrine on a case-by-case basis in bringing an end to the
economic war between states. Part IV of this Note introduces the European Union’s
State Aid Control Treaty and then describes why Congress must enact federal
legislation modeled after the European Union’s treaty to bring an end to the economic
war among states. Part V proposes federal legislation modeled after the European

14 Thompson, supra note 7.
15 Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 385–86 (1996).
16 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 281 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
17 Thompson, supra note 7.
18 Nathan M. Jensen, Job Creation and Firm-Specific Location Incentives, (Geo. Wash.
Univ., Working Paper), http://www.natemjensen.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/KansasWorking-Paper-7-23-15.pdf; see also Emily Badger, Should We Ban States and Cities from
Offering Big Tax Breaks for jobs?, WASH. POST (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/09/15/should-we-ban-states-andcities-from-offering-big-tax-breaks-for-jobs/.
19 Badger, supra note 18.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol70/iss2/8

4

2022]

ENDING THE ECONOMIC WAR AMONG STATES

339

Union’s State Aid Control Treaty and establishes Congress’ power to enact this
legislation. Part VI summarizes the assertions of the Note.
II. THE ECONOMIC WAR AMONG STATES AND THE WEAPONS OF THE WAR
In Part II.A of this Note, the arsenal of economic development incentive tools used
by states to compete for business is revealed. Then in Part II.B, the counterintuitive
result of all states losing in this competition for businesses is explained.
A.

The Weapons – Economic Development Incentives

Economic development incentives, the figurative weapons of the economic war
among states, come in an array of forms and from an array of sources. 20 However,
economic development incentives commonly come from state governments, thus
state-level incentives will be the focus of this Note. 21 Joseph Parilla and Sifan Liu of
the Brookings Institution define economic development incentives as “direct financial
benefits provided to firms to incentivize their opening, expansion, or retention.”22
Parilla and Liu note that economic development incentives are distinguished from
broader economic development efforts because the former are provided on a selective
basis to individual businesses.23 Others have defined economic development
incentives as “cash or near-cash assistance provided on a discretionary basis to attract
or retain business operations owned by large businesses.” 24 Moreover, opponents of
economic development incentives refer to theses specific incentives as “corporate
welfare” and define this welfare as government assistance offered to a business or
industry that is not offered to others.25 Estimates for the value of local and state
economic development incentives range from $45 billion to $90 billion dollars
annually.26
Economic development incentives come in many different forms. These forms
include but are not limited to investment tax credits, tax abatements, infrastructure
improvements and real estate rent reductions, industrial bonds, and worker training
incentives.27 The focus of this Note will be state-level tax incentives, which are

20 Joseph Parilla & Sifan Liu, Examining the Local Value of Economic Development
Incentives,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(March
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2018/02/report_examining-the-local-value-of-economic-developmentincentives_brookings-metro_march-2018.pdf.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Timothy J. Bartik, Solving the Problems of Economic Development Incentives, in
REIGNING IN THE COMPETITION OF CAPITAL 103, 104 (Ann Markusen, ed. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 2007).
25 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Special Report: First in a Series: Corporate Welfare,
TIME, Nov. 9, 1998, at 38.
26 Parilla & Liu, supra note 20.
27 Enrich, supra note 15.
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implemented through tax modifications for specific businesses. As previously
mentioned, incentives have the ability to be used for productive purposes, such as
uplifting an economically depressed community or expanding job opportunities.
However, these same incentives can be used by states to masquerade economic
protectionism behind the cloak of a seemingly innocent business assistance
program.28 The difficult task of determining the true motive and effect of such
incentives is hindered by the complexities of litigation; thus, as will be seen in Part V
of this Note, federal legislation is needed. Without such legislation, states will
continue to engage in a destructive economic war.
B.

The War – The Battle for Businesses

When states seek to attract or retain a business, there is often a negotiation process
that leads to businesses obtaining incentive packages from these states.29 There is not
a standardized process for determining the magnitude of business retention or
attraction incentives offered by states; thus, states compete in a guessing game of
attempting to outbid competing states without the knowledge of the substance of the
competing deals.30 This is a classic case of the prisoner’s dilemma and it can lead
states to unnecessarily offer overly generous deals to businesses. 31 While Congress
could explore drafting legislation to remedy the issue of the prisoner’s dilemma by
creating legislation that limits the scope of the deals offered to businesses or through
legislation that makes states publish the details of these deals so all parties compete
with equal information, this issue is not explored by this Note. Rather, this Note
focuses on the inevitable end result of economic development tax negotiations—some
businesses obtaining deals that their competitors cannot. The effect of these deals can
lead to unfair competition and actions contrary to achieving harmony among states.32
As noted, the economic development incentive bidding process pits states against
each other, but determining the winners and losers is not a straightforward calculation.

28 Badger, supra note 18.
29 Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction Subsidy Wars Resulting from a Prisoner’s
Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional Solutions and the Appropriateness of a
Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REV. 303, 303 (1998).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 311. Schaefer described the prisoner’s dilemma as:
Two prisoners are separately interrogated by the authorities, who attempt to extract
confessions from each implicating the other. If both are silent, each will go free. If
both confess, each will get a moderate sentence. If one confesses and the other does
not, the former will get a light sentence and the latter a heavy sentence. Accordingly,
both prisoners would be best off it each remains silent, but each fears the other will
confess. To avoid the danger of the heavy sentence that would follow from the other’s
confession, each confesses and incurs a moderate sentence. The prisoners are unable
to reach their preferred outcome (total silence) because they are unable to
communicate and reach a binding agreement.
Id.
32 Jensen, supra note 10, at 2.
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While locations that win this bidding war, such as New York and Washington, D.C.
in the case of Amazon, may claim victory, the computation is not that simple. 33 It
could be argued that there are no winners in this economic battle other than the
business who exploits the warfare between states to obtain inflated tax incentive
offers. By taking on incentive bids from across the country, the value of these offers
is artificially inflated above their efficient levels.34 For example, New York and
Washington, D.C. may have been able to attract Amazon with a lesser magnitude of
incentives than what their final offer represented, but because the bidding was not
transparent, these locations likely offered incentives at an unnecessarily high level in
an attempt to outcompete other states.35 The mechanics of this conundrum is described
below.
Economic theory would suggest that the most efficient use of resources is achieved
when the entity who values a resource the most obtains it.36 Transferring this theory
to economic development incentives, it would seem to follow that the optimal place
for Amazon to land its headquarters would be in the places demanding Amazon the
most, as represented by the magnitude of these place’s bids. States rely on this intuitive
theory and fight for businesses with tax incentive offers. However, it is not a secret
that basic academic theory does not always transfer seamlessly to the real world.37
Amazon seemingly predetermined the locations of its HQ2 before even taking on bids
and used the bidding process simply to sweeten the pot.38
The fact of the matter is states are fooled into thinking that they are competing to
win a business over.39 These states then expend their scarce resources by offering
incentives.40 However, these offers are nothing more than additional air pumping up
the magnitude of the incentives from the already decided upon state or shortlist of
states. Thus, in this war among states, a state either loses by missing out on the political
victory of securing a business, or a state loses when they achieve the political win by
winning a business over but must expend more resources than is necessary. The only

33 Thompson, supra note 7.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Roy Cordato, Free Markets and Highest Valued Use, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (May 1,
2000),
https://fee.org/articles/free-markets-and-highest-valueduse/#:~:text=The%20argument%20behind%20what%20I,whose%20bid%20is%20the%20hig
hest.
37 Id. (stating that the “highest valued use” theory relies on assumptions that cannot be
logically sustained).
38 Thompson, supra note 7.
39 Id.
40 See Michael J. Boyle, Scarcity, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 16, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/scarcity.asp; NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET
OFFICES, 2020 STATE EXPENDITURE REPORT 8 (2020).
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winner appears to be the business who picks a location and then is rewarded with
inflated incentives from the state caught in the trap of the prisoner’s dilemma.41
The scenario described above illustrates a field of defeated states gunned down by
the firepower of their neighbors and a sole winner, the business, standing in triumph
on top of these exploited states. Such an illustration is not one that was envisioned
when the Constitution was enacted to achieve unity among the states. 42 Making matter
worse, as was seen above in Part II.A, these trounced states have no shortage of
economic development incentives in their arsenal to fire at each other.43 But the
United States is not helpless in bringing an end to this destructive combat; the theory
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause provides a solution.
III. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND ITS LIMITATIONS
In Part III.A, the dormant Commerce Clause is presented. This legal doctrine
prohibits conduct by states that discriminates against interstate commerce, and it is
asserted by this Note as the theory on which Congress should enact the proposed
legislation to bring an end to the economic war among states. In Part III, Subpart B,
major Supreme Court decisions regarding state-level tax incentives are introduced,
and their holdings, which rely on the dormant Commerce Clause, are explained. Part
III.B closes by synthesizing these precedents to conclude that state tax incentives are
unconstitutional if they discriminate against interstate commerce by unduly favoring
a business in order to attract it within the state’s borders, or if these tax incentives are
used to entice a business to stay. In Part III, Subpart C, the shortcomings of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence around state tax incentives are explained by
highlighting the failings of relying on a case-by-case system. This Part concludes by
arguing that, given barriers to litigation and the actions of opportunistic states, the
case-by-case system must be replaced by legislation to truly effectuate the Supreme
Court’s dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence.
A.

The Doctrine

Through the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause has been
interpreted not only to give Congress the “positive” power to regulate interstate
commerce, but it has also been interpreted by the Court as a “negative” restraint on
state action.44 This negative interpretation, known as the dormant Commerce Clause,

41 Thompson, supra note 7; see also Schaefer, supra note 29 (describing the prisoner’s
dilemma).
42 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 231 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
43 Enrich, supra note 15.
44 See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359
(1992); see also Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992); Northwestern States
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du
Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534–35 (1949). This Note, though focusing on the dormant Commerce
Clause, will use the terms "dormant Commerce Clause" and "Commerce Clause" somewhat
interchangeably throughout. This is in line with Supreme Court cases that have done the same
in treating dormant Commerce Clause violations as violative of the Commerce Clause
itself. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 319 (1977) ("No State,
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forbids states from interfering with interstate commerce or unduly burdening interstate
commerce in the absence of legislation, and the doctrine acts as a limit on state
power.45
The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from “advancing their own
commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into
or out of the state.”46 Moreover, the Court has opined that conduct by states that
clearly discriminates against interstate commerce is unconstitutional “unless the
discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism.”47 The dormant Commerce Clause has been justified by the Supreme
Court as necessary to further “the Commerce Clause’s purpose of preventing a State
from retreating into economic isolation or jeopardizing the welfare of the Nation as a
whole.”48
Depending on the action taken by a state, the Supreme Court applies different tests
to determine whether the law is constitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause.49
However, the Court’s analysis always starts with a threshold question: Does the state
law discriminate against interstate commerce?50 A discriminatory law is one that treats
out-of-state actors, or commodities, different than in-state actors, or commodities.51
Furthermore, under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis, it has been found that the
fact that in-state actors are subject to the same discrimination as out-of-state actors is
immaterial for finding a law discriminatory.52 Thus, even though state-level tax
incentives may discriminate against one in-state actor over another in-state actor, this
fact does not prohibit a tax incentive from being found discriminatory. 53

consistent with the Commerce Clause, may 'impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce . . . .'").
45 See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326 (1979); Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax
Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
46 H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., 336 U.S. at 535.
47 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
48 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 180 (1995).
49 South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell, 303 U.S. 177, 191 (1938).
50 Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 190; see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623
(1978).
51 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27.
52 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wis., 340 U.S. 349, 354 n.4 (stating that it is immaterial
that in-state actors are subject to similar constraints as out of state actors when determining
whether a law is discriminatory).
53 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628.
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But, not all discriminatory laws are the same; there are facially discriminatory laws
and laws that are facially neutral but discriminatory in effect. 54 Nonetheless, it is
important to note that no matter the type of discriminatory law, these discriminatory
actions do not carry any presumption of constitutionality and no deference to the state
legislator is given.55 If a state law is found to be discriminatory then the court applies
a strict scrutiny analysis to determine whether a law is constitutional.56
The strict scrutiny analysis can be broken down into three steps.57 The first step is
to determine what the state’s interest is in enacting the discriminatory law, the second
step is to determine if the law is effective in furthering the state’s interest, and the third
step is to consider if there are nondiscriminatory alternatives available in achieving
the state’s goal.58 For a law to pass this test it must be effective in achieving a
legitimate state interest, such as protecting the environment of the state, and there must
not be a nondiscriminatory alternative available to achieve that interest.59 If there is
not a legitimate state interest being furthered by the action or there is a
nondiscriminatory alternative available to achieve the same end, then the law is held
to be unconstitutional.60
In the case of non-discriminatory laws—facially neutral laws that do not
discriminate against interstate commerce—the law carries a presumption of
constitutionality, and the Court applies what has become known as the Clover
Balancing Test.61
Nonetheless, a targeted state-level tax incentive is inherently discriminatory
because it is only offered to one in-state actor.62 Thus, when analyzing the
constitutionality of a state-level tax incentive, the court should apply the strict scrutiny
test and give no deference to the motivations of those who offered the incentive. Statelevel tax incentives fall under the purview of the dormant Commerce Clause because
54 See e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Com’n, 432 U.S. 333, 352–53
(1977) (serving as an example of a facially neutral yet discriminatory in effect law); City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626–27 (serving as an example of facially discriminatory law).
55 See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
56 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (applying the strict scrutiny test to a facially
discriminatory law); see also Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 353 (applying the strict scrutiny test
to a facially neutral but discriminatory in effect law).
57 Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 353–56.
58 Id.
59 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148 (stating that protecting a state’s environment is a legitimate state
interest).
60 Dean Milk Co., 340 U.S. at 355–56 (holding that a law was unconstitutional because a
non-discriminatory alternative was available).
61 Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 (1981). This test considers
whether the burdens on interstate commerce from the law are clearly excessive in relation to the
local benefit the law presumes to create. Here, the court is supposed to act in a deferential
manner to the state legislator.
62 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 273 (1984).
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their discriminatory effect may jeopardize the welfare of the Nation as a whole; this
occurs when state-level tax incentives improperly favor an in-state business with
excessive tax incentives not offered to out-of-state businesses and no legitimate
purpose to support such distribution is offered.63 Thus, the theory underlying the
dormant Commerce Clause, removed from the constraints of litigation, will be used
as the specific rationalization of this Note for enacting the proposed legislation to
prevent the use of state-level tax incentives from improperly hindering economic
activity between states. This theory can be further understood by looking at
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.
B.

Case Law Applying the Doctrine to Tax Incentives

The Supreme Court has an extensive history of ruling on state tax incentives. In
what could be argued as the most important case in this arena, Boston Stock Exchange
v. State Tax Commission, the Court ruled on whether a tax imposed by the State of
New York on securities transactions designed to assist the New York Stock Exchange
was a valid assertion of the State’s powers.64 The consequence of the tax was that outof-state companies were taxed at a higher rate than in-state companies. With this fact
in mind the Court held, “a state may no more use discriminatory taxes to assure that
nonresidents direct their commerce to business within the State than to assure that
residents trade only in intrastate commerce”65 and that “[n]o state, consistent with the
Commerce Clause may, ‘impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce . . . by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.’” 66
Subsequently, in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, the Court considered the
constitutionality of New York’s grant of a franchise tax credit to certain income of
Domestic International Sales Corporations (DISC’s).67 Relying on its holding in
Boston Stock Exchange, the Court held the franchise tax credit violated the Commerce
Clause and stated, “whether the discriminatory tax diverts new business into the State
or merely prevents current business from being diverted elsewhere, it is still a
discriminatory tax that ‘forecloses tax-neutral decisions and . . . creates . . . an
advantage’ to firms operating in New York by placing ‘a discriminatory burden on
commerce to its sister States.’”68 Thus, the Court held that forbidding a tax credit to
out-of-state corporations had the same effect as imposing a higher tax on these out-ofstate business, and therefore, the tax credit violated the Commerce Clause. 69
Next, in Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, the Court considered the constitutionality
of an exemption to Hawaii’s liquor tax for only locally produced pineapple wine and

63 See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 205–06 (1994); Bacchus
Imports, 468 U.S. at 273; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 402–03 (1984).
64 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 319 (1977).
65 Id. at 334–35.
66 Id. at 329 (quoting Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 (1959)).
67 Westinghouse, 466 U.S. at 390.
68 Id. at 406 (quoting Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331).
69 Id. at 407.
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okolehao.70 There, the Court held that the local tax exemption violated the Commerce
Clause while establishing that if a tax was “made on the basis of either discriminatory
purpose or discriminatory effect” then the tax may amount to economic
protectionism.71 Using this test, the Court found the tax exemption was “clearly
discriminatory” because the tax exemption “only applies to locally produced
beverages” while there is “competition between the locally produced exempt products
and non-exempt products from outside the State.”72
Successively, in New Energy Co. v. Limbach, the Court deliberated on the
constitutionality of an Ohio tax credit against sales tax on fuel for each gallon of
ethanol sold that was applied only to ethanol produced in Ohio.73 The Court quashed
this tax credit, holding that “state statutes that clearly discriminate against interstate
commerce are routinely struck down unless the discrimination is demonstrably
justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”74 The Court reasoned
that while the protection of the health of a state’s citizens could be a valid factor
unrelated to economic protectionism, in this case the connection between the health
of Ohio citizens and the ethanol tax credit was “no more than implausible speculation”
that would “not suffice to validate this plain discrimination against products of out-ofstate manufactures.”75 However, the Court noted that a tax incentive would be allowed
as long as it “advances a legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately served
by reasonably nondiscriminatory alternatives.”76 This assertion suggests that blatantly
discriminatory tax incentives may be permissible if they reasonably further a nondiscriminatory purpose.77
The Court again heard a case regarding tax incentives in Camps
Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, in which a Maine statute distinguished
between businesses that served interstate clientele and those that served intrastate
clientele.78 The effect of the statute was that summer camps were taxed at a higher
rate if the camp was operated principally for non-residents of Maine. The Court held
that while the camp’s goods and services were consumed locally, interstate commerce
was affected because the attendance of the students required transportation across state
lines. The corporation’s status as a nonprofit entity did not prevent the application of
the Commerce Clause.79 Thus, because the statute expressly distinguished between

70 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 265 (1984).
71 Id. at 270.
72 Id. at 271.
73 New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 280.
76 Id. at 278.
77 Id.
78 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575 (1997).
79 Id. at 584.
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entities that served principally intrastate clientele and those that served principally outof-state clientele, the statute was facially invalid under the Commerce Clause.80
Camps Newfound establishes that state laws discriminating against interstate
commerce on their face are invalid per se, irrespective of whether they apply to nonprofit or for-profit businesses.81
These holdings show that it is unconstitutional for states to discriminate against
interstate commerce by unduly favoring a business with tax treatment in order to
attract it within the states borders or using tax incentives to entice a business to stay.
While these holdings appear to prevent discriminatory tax incentives by states, they
are not foolproof, and states have discovered avenues to favor local businesses by
straddling the line of constitutionality.
C.

The Limitations of the Doctrine

Case law regarding the dormant Commerce Clause’s application to state tax
incentives is ineffective at preventing the use of discriminatory tax incentives for
several reasons. These reasons include exceptions to the dormant Commerce Clause’s
anti-discrimination requirement that may be misinterpreted, and barriers to litigation
that have become relevant due to the Court’s case-by-case analysis of state tax
incentives.
The first of these exceptions that allow states to meander their way around the
dormant Commerce Clause’s anti-discrimination provision is the market-participant
exception. The market-participant exception applies when a state enters the market as
a “participant” instead of a “regulator” of commerce.82 The doctrine was formulated
in Hughes v. Alexandra Scrap Corp., where the Court held “nothing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own
citizens over others.”83 In Alexandra Scrap, the Court held that Maryland could
“artificially enhance the value of certain abandoned . . . [automobiles]” by acting as a
purchaser in the market with state funds to ensure the removal of these abandoned
automobiles from Maryland’s streets and junkyards.84 Moreover, in a subsequent
case, Reeves v. Stake, the Court held that the State of South Dakota could act as a seller
of cement to aid the state’s cement industry under the market-participant exception.85
The market-participant exception applies only for state subsidies, not state tax
incentives. The Supreme Court has never addressed the constitutionality of non-tax
subsidies directly but held that “a pure subsidy funded out of general revenue

80 Id. at 565.
81 Id. at 581.
82 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
83 Id.
84 Id. at 809–10, 815.
85 Reeves v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 440 (1980); see also Dep’t Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 352 (2008) (holding that a discriminatory tax scheme on municipal bonds assessing a lower
tax rate on in-state municipal bonds versus out-of-state municipal bonds was allowable under
the market-participant exemption).
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ordinarily imposes no burden on interstate commerce, but merely assists local
businesses.”86
However, given that tax exemptions and subsidies serve “similar ends” it is
possible that states will seek to uphold tax incentives by transferring the marketparticipant exception from subsidies to tax incentives.87 This argument was attempted
by the State of Maine in Camps Newfound/Owatonna.88 The Court rejected this
argument stating that an “open-ended exemption for charitable and benevolent
institutions is not analogous to the industry-specific state actions that [the Court]
reviewed in Alexandria Scrap and Reeves.”89 However, it follows that states may
nevertheless attempt this argument of using the market-participant exemption by
styling a tax incentive to target a specific industry.90 The Court addressed this concern
stating “our cases do not sanction tax exemptions serving similar ends” as subsidies. 91
While it would be logical to assume states would take notice of this holding and treat
it as controlling, it is evident that states continually attempt to challenge the Court’s
holdings by imposing discriminatory tax incentives.92 Thus, case law on the subject
has proved to be ineffective at deterring states from imposing discriminatory tax
incentives by falsely relying on the market-participant exception.
The next barrier preventing Commerce Clause case law from being effective in
regulating state tax incentives is the discrimination exception noted in New Energy
Co. v. Limbach.93 There, the Court held, “state statutes that clearly discriminate
against interstate commerce are routinely struck down unless the discrimination is
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic protectionism.”94 The
Court noted that a tax incentive would be allowed as long as it “advance[s] a legitimate
local purpose that could not be adequately served by reasonably nondiscriminatory
alternatives.”95 Or in other words, “what may appear to be a ‘discriminatory’
provision in the constitutionally prohibited sense—that is, a protectionist enactment—

86 West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 214 (1994) (Rehnquist. C.J.,
dissenting).
87 Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 589 (1997).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 See West Lynn Creamery, Inc., 512 U.S. at 187; New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S.
269, 277 (1988); Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 589.
91 Camps Newfound, 520 U.S. at 589.
92 Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 403 (1984).
93 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 274.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 278; see, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458
U.S. 941, 958 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336–37 (1979); Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
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may on closer analysis not be so.”96 The Court went on to note that the standards for
this justification are high, but even so, this does not prevent states from attempting to
impose tax incentives that are discriminatory under the guise of a “legitimate local
purpose” that is not genuine.97 Thus, case law on the subject is ineffective at deterring
states from imposing discriminatory tax incentives because states may falsely rely on
the “legitimate local purpose” exception.98
Moreover, as a proliferation of the obstacles discussed above, dormant Commerce
Clause case law is ineffective at preventing discriminatory tax incentives because of
barriers to litigation. The holding in Boston Stock Exchange, that “no state, consistent
with the Commerce Clause, may impose a tax which discriminates against interstate
commerce by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business,”99 did not
become a controlling prohibition on discriminatory state tax incentives. Rather,
challenges to state tax incentives must be deliberated on a case-by-case basis given
the absence of congressional action and ambitious states challenging the Court’s tax
incentive holdings.
However, those individuals or entities that have the motivation to challenge
discriminatory tax incentives face hurdles in bringing suits against states. These
potential plaintiffs include individual taxpayers, injured businesses, and competing
states. Individual taxpayers have both financial and legal barriers. It is not a question
of whether litigation is expensive. The costs of litigation to an individual taxpayer may
not be worthwhile when weighing the risks. This financial barrier prevents the
bringing of possible successful suits, and this inefficiency is caused by the case-bycase analysis.
Furthermore, taxpayers face the legal barrier of proving standing to bring suits. In
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, local taxpayers brought a suit against
DaimlerChrysler Corp., and state and local officials, alleging that tax incentives
offered to the automobile manufacture violated the Commerce Clause by depleting
state and local treasuries to which they contributed.100 The agreement in question
allowed for DaimlerChrysler to expand its local assembly plant, purchase, and install
new manufacturing equipment in return for the City of Toledo, Ohio to waive the
property tax for the plant and for the State of Ohio to give the corporation a credit
against the state’s franchise tax.101 At the district court level, the Court held that the
taxpayer plaintiffs had standing under the “municipal taxpayer standing” rule.102
However, the District Court found that neither the municipal property tax exemption

96 New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
97 Id.
98 See id.
99 Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977).
100 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 343–44 (2006).
101 Id. at 338–39.
102 DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 339–40 (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447 (1923)).
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nor the state franchise tax credit violated the Commerce Clause.103 The case was
appealed by the taxpayers to the Sixth Circuit, which agreed with the District Court
regarding the municipal property tax exemption but held that the state franchise tax
credit violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce
in “coercing businesses already subject to the Ohio franchise tax to expand locally
rather than out of state.”104
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review whether the state franchise tax
credit violated the Commerce Clause, and in doing so directed the parties to address
the issue of standing under Article III of the U.S. Constitution. 105 The Court held that
the Plaintiffs, state taxpayers, did not have standing under Article III to challenge state
tax or spending decisions simply by their virtue as state and municipal taxpayers.106
The Court opined that state taxpayers lacked standing because the alleged injuries
were not “concrete and particularized” in that the injury depended on how legislators
respond to the reduction in revenue.107 Thus, the Court did not reach the merits of this
case regarding the state franchise tax credit’s implications on the Commerce Clause.
DaimlerChrysler illustrates the barrier that taxpayers face in bringing suits
regarding the implications of tax incentives on the Commerce Clause.108 Because state
taxpayers face the burden of showing “concrete and particularized” injury to challenge
a state tax incentive, cases of this type will not be brought as often as the merits of the
case may require. Thus, the reliance on a case-by-case determination of whether a tax
incentive violates the Commerce Clause is, again, shown to be inefficient.
Moreover, injured businesses that are discriminated against in interstate commerce
will also face barriers in bringing suits that hold states accountable for violations of
the Commerce Clause. Like individual taxpayers, businesses must weigh the financial
risk of litigation when determining whether to bring a suit challenging a state tax credit
rewarded to a competing business. This exemplifies another inefficiency of the
reliance on a case-by-case system to determine whether a state tax incentive violates
the Commerce Clause.
Finally, states face unique burdens in determining whether to challenge the use of
a discriminatory tax credit used by other states. States seek to attract business into their
jurisdiction to benefit from the jobs, human capital, and revenue provided by these
entities.109 As an initial matter, states may not challenge possibly discriminatory tax
incentives because in doing so, they may limit themselves from the use of their own
similar incentives, which state officials use to attract businesses and claim political
victories. If a particular state is aware that other states are using tax credits to attract
businesses, then that state will feel pressured to not limit its own arsenal of

103 DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 340.
104 Cuno v. Daimler Chrysler, Inc., 386 F.3d 738, 743 (6th Cir. 2004).
105 DaimlerChrysler Corp., 547 U.S. at 340.
106 Id. at 346.
107 Id. at 344.
108 See id.
109 Schaefer, supra note 29, at 309.
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development tools.110 This demonstrates the “prisoner’s dilemma” effect which leads
to a sub-optimal use of resources.111 In this context, the resource is meritorious
litigation of discriminatory incentives, and because states may choose not to challenge
discriminatory tax incentives based solely on a political rationale, a sub-optimal
number of suits challenging discriminatory state tax incentives will result. 112 This,
too, exemplifies another inefficiency of the reliance on a case-by-case system used to
determine whether a state tax incentive violates the Commerce Clause.
The above illustrations exemplify the ineffectiveness of a case-by-case approach;
thus, a different approach is necessary. By acknowledging the value of the theory
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause but noting the limitations of the dormant
Commerce Clause in effectuating change on a case-by-case basis, it is evident that
ending the economic war among states requires federal legislation modeled after the
European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty.
IV. THE EU’S STATE AID CONTROL TREATY AND THE NEED FOR A DOMESTIC VERSION
In Part IV.A, the European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty is introduced. This
treaty acts as a general prohibition against state aid in the European Union to prevent
the distortion of competition across the member states. 113 However, the treaty does
allow for exceptions to this general-prohibition rule by providing an allowance of state
aid that is deemed compatible with explicit policy goals of the EU. In Subpart B, this
Note argues that the EU’s State Aid Control Treaty should act as the framework for
Congress to enact the proposed legislation of this Note. There is currently no federal
regulation in place regarding state-level tax incentives; thus, states arguably abuse
their use of these tools leading to destructive competition among states. This Note’s
proposed legislation seeks to bring an end to this injurious conundrum.
A.

The Treaty

The European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty, Article 107 of the Treaty on the
Function of the European Union, was established by the European Union to impede
member states from offering aid that unduly distorts competition across the EU.114
Under the treaty, “State Aid” is defined as “an advantage in any form whatsoever
conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities.” 115 For
a subsidy to be classified as State Aid the support must contain the following features:

110 Id. at 311.
111 Id. at 303.
112 See id.
113 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 107,
Feb. 7, 1992, 2008 O.J. (C115) 91–92 [hereinafter TFEU].
114
Id.;
State
Aid,
EUR.
COMM’N
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/overview/index_en.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).
115 State Aid (Notion), CONCURRENCES, https://www.concurrences.com/en/dictionary/stateaid (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2022

17

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

352

[70:335

1.

There has been intervention by the State or through State Resources
which can take a variety of forms;

2.

The intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis,
for example to specific companies or industry sectors, or to companies
located in specific regions;

3.

Competition has been or may be distorted; and

4.

The intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States. 116

While the treaty is a general prohibition against State Aid, it does allow for several
exceptions based on policy objectives with which State Aid can be considered
compatible.117 The treaty itself explicitly outlines these exemptions and the laws are
routinely reviewed and updated to improve efficiency and to provide targeted aid to
boost the economy.118 The adoption of the updates is done in close cooperation with
the Member States.119
Moreover, the treaty has a number of transparency requirements, with a provision
that creates a “state aid transparency public search.”120 This “search” gives citizens
and companies access to information listing individual award data provided by
Member States.121 This data includes the name of the beneficiary, amount of the
award, location, sector, and objective.122 While this portion of the EU’s State Aid
Control Treaty could be used to address the issue of the prisoner’s dilemma found as
part of the state-level tax incentive bidding process, that is not the focus of this
Note.123
The EU’s State Aid Control Treaty will be used in this Note as the basic framework
on which to establish the proposed legislation of this Note in the United States.
B.

The Need for The United States to Adopt a Domestic Version

There is currently no national legislation in the United States regulating the act or
process of states awarding tax incentives to businesses. While this lack of legislation
may be attributed to the reverence the Country holds for state sovereignty, it is evident
that a lack of regulation has led to a circumstance even more unsettling than a minor
infringement on the power of states—the United States is being divided through

116 Id.
117 TFEU, supra note 113.
118 Id.
119 State Aid (Notion), supra note 115.
120
State
Aid
Transparency
Public
Search,
EUR.
COMM’N,
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/competition/transparency/public?lang=en (last updated Jan. 7,
2016).
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 See discussion supra Part II.B.
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economic warfare over businesses. 124 The Constitution was not created to empower
individual states at the expense of the entire Nation, but was rather created to unify
states so cooperation would benefit the greater good.125 While it is recognized that the
proposed legislation in this Note will invade on the power states hold today, this minor
infringement should not dissuade even the most passionate states’ right advocates.
Legislation modeled after the European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty, with its
underlying theory grounded in the dormant Commerce Clause, will do no more than
take away a state’s ability to grant unconstitutional discriminatory tax incentives.
States will still enjoy the ability to grant economic development incentives that align
with the legislation, and states will possess the power to influence the legislation
through congressional representation. The legislation will prevent businesses from
exploiting states for incentive packages, as the types of incentives allowed to be
offered will be limited to the confines of the theory underlying the dormant Commerce
Clause. Concurrently, the ineffectiveness of the case-by-case system currently in place
to enforce the anti-discrimination principle of the Commerce Clause will be corrected
by removing the analysis from the labyrinthine court system.
As will be seen in the next Part, the United States already has the legal
infrastructure to enact an effective domestic version of the European Union’s State
Aid Control Treaty.
V. THE PROPOSED LEGISLATION AND CONGRESS’ POWER TO ENACT FEDERAL
LEGISLATION
In Part V, the proposed legislation of this Note is revealed, and the constitutionality
of the legislation is proven. In Subpart A, it is argued that, given the nexus between
discriminatory behavior under the Commerce Clause and anti-competitive action by
businesses, Congress should use the expertise of the Federal Trade Commission to
enforce the proposed legislation of this Note. In Subpart B, the proposed legislation
of this Note is announced. This proposed legislation is molded by the European
Union’s State Aid Control Treaty but is modified to accommodate for the distinct legal
doctrines of the United States. In Subpart C, an overview of the Commerce Clause is
given: the Commerce Clause is the legal authority that empowers Congress to enact
the legislation proposed by this Note. Under the Commerce Clause, the proposed
legislation of this Note is constitutional.
A. Incorporating the United States Anti-Trust Laws
While the framework of the European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty
establishes the groundwork to enact legislation regulating state tax incentives in the
United States, the United States may also call on its anti-trust regulations to effectuate
a domestic version of the treaty. The United States’ anti-trust laws are statutes
designed to “ensure that fair competition exists in an open-market economy.”126 This

124 Id.
125 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 223 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
126 James Chen, Understanding Antitrust Laws, INVESTOPEDIA (July 31, 2020),
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/09/antitrustlaw.asp#:~:text=Antitrust%20laws%20are%20statutes%20developed,%2C%20price%20fixin
g%2C%20and%20monopolies.
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goal is not so different from that of the dormant Commerce Clause which prohibits
states from “passing legislation that discriminates against or excessively burdens
interstate commerce” and prevents “protectionist state policies that favor state . . .
businesses at the expense of non-citizens conducting business within that state.”127
The commonality between the dormant Commerce Clause and the United States’ antitrust laws is the goal of protecting against distorted competition in markets. Having
established this interrelation, it is evident that Congress can use the United States’
anti-trust laws as a basis for supporting necessary legislation to regulate state tax
incentives.128
As stated, the United States’ anti-trust laws are designed to “ensure that fair
competition exists in an open-market economy.”129 These anti-trust laws include the
“Big Three” anti-trust laws: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade
Commission Act.130 While the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act are part of the
groundwork of the anti-trust laws in the United States, this Note relies on the Federal
Trade Commission Act for support. The Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair
methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.”131 Moreover, the
Federal Trade Commission Act established the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), a
federal agency, which has the expertise to bring cases under the Act.132 In recognition
of the expertise of the agency, the FTC is the only federal agency that brings cases
under the Federal Trade Commission Act.133
The described scope of the Federal Trade Commission Act highlights the similarity
between actions discriminatory to interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause
and anti-competitive behavior under the United States’ anti-trust laws. This nexus
suggests that the FTC is equipped to enforce the provisions of the proposed legislation

127 Legal Information Institute, Commerce Clause: “Dormant” Commerce Clause, CORNELL
LAW SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/commerce_clause; see also West Lynn Creamery
Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (holding that a state tax on milk products discriminated
against out-of-state producers of milk products in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause).
128 One may wonder why the United States anti-trust laws alone should not be used to bring
an end to discriminatory tax incentives. However, the anti-trust laws of the United States cannot
be applied directly to states because states are not a “person” under the Acts. Parker v. Brown,
317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943). State officials are immune from federal anti-trust lawsuits for actions
taken pursuant to a clearly expressed state policy because nothing in the language of the federal
anti-trust laws or their history suggests that “Congress intended to restrict the sovereign capacity
of the States to regulate their economies”, and therefore, the anti-trust laws “should not be read
to bar States from imposing market restraints ‘as an act of government.’” FTC v. Phoebe Putney
Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 224 (2013) (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352
(1943)). This doctrine is known as the “state-action immunity.” Id. at 225.
129 Chen, supra note 126.
130 Id.; Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38; Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914,
15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27; Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58.
131 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
132 Id. § 41.
133 Id. § 45.
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in this Note. The expertise of the FTC combined with the general framework of the
European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty would act as an effective measure in
replacing the current practice of analyzing discriminatory state tax incentives on a
case-by-case basis through litigation.
B.

The Proposed Legislation

The EU’s State Aid Control Treaty is a general prohibition against State Aid.134
State Aid is “an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to
undertakings by national public authorities.”135 However, as has been noted
throughout this Note, not all uses of public monies given on a selective basis are
unlawful in the United States.136 Thus, adopting legislation as sweeping in scope as
the EU’s State Aid Control Treaty would be incompatible with the laws of this Nation.
Rather, the legislation that Congress should implement should be focused solely
on preventing states from implementing discriminatory tax incentives. To do so, the
EU’s State Aid Control Treaty should be adjusted to conform with this goal. Rather
than defining “State Aid” as support with the features of:
1.

There has been intervention by the State or through State Resources
which can take a variety of forms;

2.

The intervention gives the recipient an advantage on a selective basis,
for example to specific companies or industry sectors, or to companies
located in specific regions;

3.

Competition has been or may be distorted; and

4.

The intervention is likely to affect trade between Member States;137

Congress should replace “State Aid” with “state tax incentives” with the following
features:
1.

A State has offered an advantage in the form of a tax incentive;

2.

The advantage was offered to a specific business on a selective basis in
that the tax incentive is not available to all the businesses within the state;

3.

Competition in the market has been or may be distorted; and

4.

The intervention is likely to affect or may affect interstate commerce.

Moreover, instead of adopting the EU’s State Aid Control Treaty’s general
prohibition, Congress should capitalize on the expertise of the FTC to enforce this new
legislation. Thus, the scope of the FTC’s power would be extended to include review
authority over state tax incentive action. To circumvent the barriers of litigation, states,
when offering a tax incentive to a selective business, would have it reviewed by the
FTC. The FTC would be advised to use their expertise to determine if a tax incentive

134 TFEU, supra note 113.
135 State Aid (Notion), supra note 115.
136 See discussion supra Part III.C.
137 State Aid (Notion), supra note 115.
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would have a discriminatory effect under the Commerce Clause. If so, the state would
be barred from continuing to implement that tax incentive if it does not further some
legitimate state interest, as declared in the legislation.
In line with the market-participant exception and the “legitimate state interest”
exception derived from the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, this
proposed legislation would contain exceptions to its general rule, just as the EU’s State
Aid Control Treaty does. The EU’s State Aid Control Treaty may allow State Aid if it
is justified by objectives that support the general welfare such as “aid to promote the
development of disadvantaged areas or for services of general economic interest, small
and medium-sized enterprises, research and development, environmental protection,
training, employment and culture.”138 Congress should adopt the same approach in
this legislation. Tax incentives, such as historical tax credits, research and
development tax credits, and job training tax credits, could all be exceptions to the
legislation’s general rule. Furthermore, state-offered subsidies and other economic
development tools would not be subject to review.
This proposed legislation would uphold the Commerce Clause jurisprudence of the
United States, capitalize on the agency expertise of the FTC, and eliminate the
inefficiencies currently in place under the case-by-case analysis of discriminatory state
tax incentives. The proposed legislation leaves the sovereignty of each state intact,
leaving them the power to formulate and impose tax incentives as they see fit by only
limiting the imagination and ingenuity of these state officials to the confines of the
Constitution.
C.

Power to Enact the Legislation under the Commerce Clause

The Commerce Clause gives Congress the power “to regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”139
Congress has repeatedly used this provision of the Constitution to enact legislation
regulating businesses and their practices.140 The ability of Congress to regulate under
the Commerce Clause is limited to activities that are encompassed under the broad
umbrella of commercial intercourse among the states. 141 Commercial intercourse
includes (i) activities that use the channels of interstate commerce (ii) activities that
involve the use of instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and (iii) activities that
substantially effect interstate commerce.142
Channels refer to the pathways of facilitating interstate commerce such as
highways, waterways, airways used by planes, and even hotels or restaurants.143
Instrumentalities refer to the means by which interstate commerce occurs, which

138
Glossary
of
Summaries:
State
Aid,
EUR.
UNION,
lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/state_aid.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2021).

https://eur-

139 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
140 See discussion infra Part V.C.
141 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189–90 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring).
142 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
143 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
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includes things in interstate commerce such as cars, trucks, ships, airplanes, and people
in interstate commerce.144 Congress’ ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause
is at its strongest if channels or instrumentalities are involved; however, if these two
categories are absent from legislation, Congress may be able to regulate an activity if
it meets the substantial effects test.145
If Congress is regulating a channel or instrumentality of interstate commerce, then
no further analysis is needed, and Congress will be found to have the power to regulate
these matters under the Commerce Clause.146 However, the analysis using the
substantial effects test is more nuanced.
The substantial effects test starts with a threshold question: is the matter in question
an activity or inactivity?147 If the matter is an activity then the analysis continues, if
the matter is an inactivity then the regulation is considered unconstitutional. 148 After
passing through the threshold question, the next determination that must be made is
whether the activity is economic or non-economic?149 Economic activity is defined
as, “the production, distribution or consumption” of a commodity or service. 150
After determining if the activity is economic or not, the test splits into two different
analyses: one for economic activity and one for noneconomic activity. Under the
economic activity test, Congress may regulate an economic activity if there is a
rational basis to conclude that the activity, in the aggregate, would have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.151 Under the noneconomic activity test, Congress may
regulate the activity if there is a jurisdictional element in the legislation making a
connection to interstate commerce.152 If there is not a jurisdictional element then
Congress may only regulate the noneconomic activity if there are congressional

144 See, e.g., Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R.
Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
145 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 549 (2012).
146 Houston, 234 U.S. at 351 (holding Congress has the power to regulate instrumentalities);
see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (stating that a
hotel could be considered a channel of interstate commerce and thus Congress would have the
power to regulate them).
147 Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 550.
148 Id. at 552.
149 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (holding that if Congress has a rational
basis to conclude that an economic activity, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce then Congress can regulate the activity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
(holding that congress may only regulate a noneconomic activity if there is an interstate
jurisdictional issue, there is congressional findings that the activity would effect interstate
commerce and that there is a sufficient nexus between the activity and interstate commerce).
150 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005).
151 Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304.
152 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
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findings that the activity would affect interstate commerce. 153 In the case of
noneconomic activity there must be a nexus between the activity and interstate
commerce, or stated differently, that the link between the activity and interstate
commerce cannot be too attenuated.154
Here, if Congress adopts the framework of the European Union’s State Aid Control
Treaty, they will by nature be regulating the instrumentalities and channels of
interstate commerce. The proposed legislation regulates the states’ ability to give
incentives to businesses in interstate commerce. Thus, the subject of the regulation is
businesses in interstate commerce. By the nature of this classification, the businesses
that would be subject to this regulation are instrumentalities of interstate commerce
because businesses are the vehicles by which interstate commerce is carried out.155
Moreover, some of the businesses would also fall under the channel’s category of the
Commerce Clause analysis because the Supreme Court has established that businesses
such as restaurants and hotels are to be considered channels of interstate commerce.156
However, if this proposed legislation were to be challenged in court and creative
lawyering established that the subject of the legislation was not businesses, but rather
the incentives themselves, the regulation would still pass judicial scrutiny under the
substantial effects test.
As noted, the substantial effects test has been applied by the Court differently
depending on the activity under consideration.157 The threshold question, no matter
the activity under scrutiny, is whether the matter being regulated is an activity or an
inactivity.158 As intuition would lead, an activity is the act of doing something, while
a non-activity is the state of not doing something. The Court has stated that a person

153 Id. at 561–68.
154 Id.
155 Houston, E. & W.T.R. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (holding Congress has
the power to regulate instrumentalities of interstate commerce).
156 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964) (stating that a
hotel could be considered a channel of interstate commerce); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302
(stating that a restaurant could be considered a channel of interstate commerce).
157 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that Congress may regulate an
intrastate activity in order to achieve an legitimate end if it has an effect on interstate
commerce); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that Congress may regulate a
local activity if in the aggregate the activity would have a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce); Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 241 (holding that Congress may
prohibit discriminatory policies by hotels because in the aggregate the policies have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce); Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 304 (1964) (holding that if
Congress has a rational basis to conclude that an economic activity, in the aggregate, has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce then Congress can regulate the activity); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 549 (holding that Congress may only regulate a noneconomic activity if there is an
interstate jurisdictional issue, there is congressional findings that the activity would effect
interstate commerce and that there is a sufficient nexus between the activity and interstate
commerce).
158 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 550 (2012).
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not enrolling in health insurance is considered an inactivity,159 but there is no
congruency of that situation to the matter at hand. Here, Congress is regulating the
state’s ability to give economic incentives to businesses within their state. By the
nature of this legislation, states must be acting to fall under the legislation. Thus,
Congress would be regulating an activity in the federal legislation which adopts the
framework of the European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty.
The next step is to determine whether the activity is economic or noneconomic.
Economic activities have been considered acts such as implementing employment
regulations, growing home-grown crops, and acts related to loan sharking.160 Here,
the activity being regulated is a state’s ability to give economic incentives to
businesses. Thus, this regulation is focused on economic activity, as any business
receiving an incentive will be involved in either production, distribution, or
consumption of a commodity or service. When an activity is deemed economic, the
Court has implemented a rational basis test that considers whether Congress could
reasonably believe that the activity would substantially affect interstate commerce.161
Under judicial scrutiny, this proposed legislation would easily pass this test. It would
only be necessary to find that there is a rational basis for believing that tax incentives
given to businesses would substantially affect interstate commerce.162 This would not
be difficult to establish as economic development incentives account for between $45
to $90 billion per year of public monies being added into the economy—an obvious
rational basis for concluding that economic development incentives have a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.163 An analysis using the strict scrutiny test is not
necessary to indulge in as this legislation, if not concerning channels or
instrumentalities, would be found to be concerning economic activity.
Nonetheless, finding that Congress has the power to regulate a subject does not
end the analysis; Congress’ power to regulate is limited by Tenth Amendment.164 The
Court has held that Congress cannot “commandeer” states to pass legislation
according to congressional direction; in other words, Congress does not have the
power to regulate state governments’ regulation of commerce.165 Moreover, the Court
has repeatedly recognized the importance of states acting as “laboratories” to try novel
social and economic experiments.166
159 Id.
160 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (stating that the activity of employment
regulation is economic activity); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 111 (stating growing wheat at home is
economic activity); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (stating that loansharking is economic
activity).
161 Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 258.
162 Id.
163 Parilla and Liu, supra note 20.
164 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
165 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
166 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 196 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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Importantly, this proposed regulation will not “commandeer” states to pass
legislation under the direction of Congress; rather, it will only prohibit states from
granting economic development incentives that are contrary to the anti-discrimination
provision of the Commerce Clause.167 That is, this proposed legislation only prevents
states from using economic development incentives that are themselves
unconstitutional. Secondly, in addressing the “laboratories” assertion, it would be
illogical, and illegal, to extend this contention to include experimentation with
unconstitutional ideas.
In conclusion, because this legislation can be found to be concerning
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, channels of interstate commerce, or
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, Congress has the
power under the Commerce Clause to regulate these incentive packages. Furthermore,
this proposed legislation does “commandeer” states to pass legislation under the
direction of Congress, but only prohibits the granting of otherwise unconstitutional
incentives. Thus, this proposed legislation is legal as it passes constitutional scrutiny.
VI. CONCLUSION
The competition among states to attract businesses gives no indication of seizing.
States will continue to attempt to attract businesses for the benefits that these
companies represent; whether it be job growth numbers, the possible future tax
revenue the companies represent, or the pure political win attracting a business
provides. As part of this competition, state-level tax incentives will continue to play a
role, and thus, it is imperative that the tax incentives offered are within the limits of
the Constitution. The Constitution, as seen through dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, makes it unlawful for states to implement tax incentives that
discriminate against interstate commerce.168
Currently, state-level tax incentives are unregulated by the federal government; the
only safeguard to ensuring the constitutionality of state-level tax incentives is the caseby-case analysis by the United States judiciary. This case-by-case analysis suffers
from inefficiencies because this system requires litigants to bring a suit against a state
while facing both procedural and political barriers.169 Moreover, states have shown
that they are willing to push the barriers of the constitutional limits on tax incentives
in order to compete for businesses. States either disregard the tax incentive
jurisprudence or misapply the exceptions to this jurisprudence when formulating tax
incentives. Given the importance of the cooperation between states to the Nation as a
whole and the necessity of ensuring businesses compete in a free market, this case-bycase system of inefficiencies that regulates opportunistic states is insufficient to
uphold the anti-discrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.
The European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty offers a framework for enacting
legislation in the United States to prevent the continuation of discriminatory tax
incentives. Currently, states compete for business with what are arguably
discriminatory incentives, and given the mechanisms of the bidding process, these

167 See Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992)
(quoting H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1959)).
168 Healy, 512 U.S. at 388.
169 See DaimlerChrystler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332 (2006).
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incentives exploit the resources of all states involved—hurting not only the states that
lose the incentive bidding war but, paradoxically, the state that wins the bidding war
as well. Enacting legislation modeled after the EU’s State Aid Control Treaty would
provide a means to ensure that all state-level tax incentives are within the bounds of
the Constitution.
By enacting this legislation, states will be forced to compete for businesses with
incentives that do not discriminate against interstate commerce, and such a
requirement will work to save states from each other by limiting offered incentives to
those that are in pursuit of a “legitimate state interest.” This limit will also restrain the
ability of businesses to exploit states for artificially inflated incentive packages as
states will be required to prove the legitimacy of the incentives offered within the
confines of the Constitution, likely limiting the breadth of incentives offered from
what they are today.
Thus, given the limits of the dormant Commerce Clause in effectuating change
through litigation, ending the economic war among states requires the theory
underlying the dormant Commerce Clause to be promulgated into federal legislation
modeled after the European Union’s State Aid Control Treaty.
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